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QO^REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a public en t i t y , 
Plaintiff , 
v. 
ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an individual 
d/b/a the Pawn Shop, a Utah 
corporation; and TERRY 
PANTELAKIS, an individual d/b/a 
Jewelers & Loans, 
TAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0000O0000- • 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D. 
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE 
BARROWS, et al. , 
Defendants and Respondents. 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a public entity, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D. 
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE 
BARROWS, ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an 
individual d/b/a The Pawn Shop; 
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah corporation 
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual 
d/b/a Jim's Ribs; TERRY 
PANTELAKIS, an individual d/b/a 
Jewelers & Loans and Sales, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooooOoooo 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a public entity, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an individual 
d/b/a the Pawn Shop, a Utah 
corporation; and TERRY 
PANTELAKIS, an individual d/b/a 
Jewelers & Loans, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D. 
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE 
BARROWS, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a public entity, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D. 
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE 
BARROWS, ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an 
individual d/b/a The Pawn Shop; 
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah corporation 
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual 
d/b/a Jim's Ribs; TERRY 
PANTELAKIS, an individual d/b/a 
Jewelers & Loans and Sales, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 880302-CA 
Case No. 880292-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Defendants and Appellants Burge, Barrows and Barrows, by 
and through their attorney of record, John T. Evans, hereby 
petition the Court for a rehearing in connection with the Opinion 
of the Court in the above-entitled matters filed on October 11, 
1989, as to issues I and III set forth in such Opinion, as follows: 
POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER SPECIFIC PROVISIONS 
IN THE STIPULATION AND THE MATERIALITY OF 
POSSESSION IN DETERMINING WHETHER INTEREST 
SHOULD BE PAID. 
In the discussion beginning on page 8 of the Court's Opinion 
as to the issue of the payment of interest on funds deposited with 
the Court, the Court concludes that the owners should receive no 
interest because the RDA did not receive possession. In other 
words, the taking of actual possession was the consideration for 
the payment of interest. 
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court compares the 
stipulation with Utah Code Anno. Section 78-34-9 (1987) (herein 
"Section 9") and seems to conclude that since their purpose and 
requirements closely parallel each other, the parties must have 
intended that the stipulation be interpreted in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 9. The Court seems to reason that Section 
9 does not provide for interest to accrue until possession is 
transferred, therefore the parties must have intended that their 
stipulation so provide. 
The Court, however, should not overlook the fact that (1) the 
terms of the stipulation show no relationship between payment of 
interest and possession; and (2) even if possession was 
consideration for the payment of interest, interest should be paid 
because possession was not material. 
1. This Court agrees that "the document at issue is an 
agreement, stipulated to by the parties.M (Opinion at page 8.) 
Inasmuch as we are interpreting an agreement entered into between 
the parties, the Court should look at the actual provisions of the 
stipulation to determine the intent of the parties. 
The terms of the stipulation contemplate the payment of 
interest without transferring possession. Although the intent of 
the stipulation is to accomplish the same purpose as that of a 
Section 9 order, i.e., to establish the terms for obtaining 
possession, the issue before this Court, however, is to harmonize 
the terms within the stipulation, not to determine what are the 
terms of Section 9. If anything is obvious from the agreement, it 
is that the parties intended to deviate from the provisions of 
Section 9. The stipulation requires a 100% deposit of the 
appraised value instead of 75% required by Section 9, the 
stipulation requires the owners to give up their right to contest 
RDA's power of condemnation if the ADL is signed with Lincoln, not 
just when funds are withdrawn as provided in Section 9, and the 
stipulation provides for interest to run at a rate of 11 1/2% 
instead of the 8% provided for in Section 9. 
That the payment of interest was consideration for the right 
to receive possession and not actual possession, is evident from 
other important provisions in the stipulation overlooked in the 
Opinion that deviate from 78-34-9, as follows: 
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(a) In the first place, the stipulation is silent as to 
a consideration that would pass to the owners for their promise to 
give up possession. If the payment of interest was consideration 
for actual possession, what was the consideration for the owners' 
promise to give up their defenses to plaintiffs right to take? It 
is obvious that the owners gave up their legal defenses by giving 
the plaintiff the right to take possession when entering into the 
ADL. The right to assert these defenses were valuable rights which 
the owners gave up by their promise, and it was that promise that 
was all the RDA really wanted or needed. The opinion acknowledges 
that the stipulation is a contract. It does not matter whether the 
label put upon the terms is that of "option" or something else. 
The fact is that the owners1 promise to abandon their defenses is 
a valuable consideration going to the RDA even absent any actual 
transfer of possession. No other consideration for such promise 
is provided in the stipulation other than the payment of interest, 
and the Opinion overlooks what consideration passed for the owners' 
promise. If the payment of interest was not the consideration, 
then the RDA got everything it wanted (assurance given to Lincoln 
of its power to condemn) and gave up nothing to get that assurance. 
(b) The payment of interest under the stipulation 
accrues only against those funds being held on deposit with the 
Clerk, whereas under Section 9, no interest is paid on the funds 
on deposit. The Court's Opinion does not address the fact that a 
ruling that the payment of interest is consideration only for 
actual possession, creates a contradiction. This is because 
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without the ADL being signed, actual possession could only be 
transferred by the act of withdrawing funds from the Clerk. The 
very funds being withdrawn are the funds on which interest is to 
be running. The incongruity is obvious. To earn interest, the 
funds must be withdrawn, but any funds withdrawn will not earn 
interest. It is analogous to a bank stating that I will pay you 
a higher rate of interest on money on your savings account so long 
as you do not keep any funds in that account. To interpret the 
stipulation as stating that the RDA promised to pay interest on the 
funds on deposit only if those funds are withdrawn, is an illusory 
promise. The fact that interest is to be paid only on such funds 
on deposit points out that the extent of the stipulation was for 
the RDA to provide for interest payments without receiving actual 
possession,, 
(c) Section 9 interest begins accruing from the time 
actual possession is transferred which time shall be fixed by the 
Court. The stipulation provides, however, that interest shall 
begin running before the RDA takes possession and no time is fixed 
for the transfer of possession even though interest is still 
accruing. This shows there is no relationship between the time 
interest is to begin running and the time possession is to be 
received. Section 1(a) of the Stipulation provides that interest 
shall accrue from August 16, 1985, when the promise (option) was 
entered into and the funds were deposited, not on the date 
possession was to be transferred. It was never contemplated by the 
parties that actual possession shall commence on August 16, 1985. 
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(d) The stipulation also provides that the interest held 
by the Clerk can be withdrawn without waiving the owners1 defenses 
to the taking. Withdrawal under Section 78-34-9, however, would 
constitute an abandonment of the owners• right to contest RDA power 
to obtain possession. Under the stipulation, possession will be 
transferred only when the deposit of $275,220.00 is withdrawn, not 
when they withdrawn the interest earned thereon. Referring to the 
deposited amount of $275,220.00, paragraph 1(a) states: "The 
withdrawal of all or any part of said deposited funds by . . . 
(owners) shall constitute a waiver of any and all defenses to the 
taking. . . . " (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 1(e) likewise states 
that the plaintiff may not begin "collecting rent ..." until the 
owners "have . . . withdrawn part or all of the $275,220.00 
deposited with the clerk. . . . " 
These provisions are not addressed by the Court in its 
Opinion. Had possession been a condition for receiving interest 
payments, the contract would have provided for the transfer of 
possession upon the withdrawal of interest. 
2. Interest should at least be awarded after off-setting 
rents received. The RDA did not need nor want actual possession. 
The project proposed by Lincoln was still in its preliminary stages 
and no design or projected use for the property had yet been 
finalized. Construction was months or years away as it effected 
the subject property. 
All that the RDA needed or wanted was to be able to 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of Lincoln that the RDA had the 
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right to obtain possession when needed. The only thing that the 
RDA needed was the owners1 promise to give possession, which 
promise (option) was received when the stipulation was entered 
into. At that moment, the RDA received the benefit for which 
consideration had to pass to the owners in the form of the promised 
interest. 
Therefore, if the Court remains of the opinion that actual 
possession was a condition to the payment of interest, then it 
should rule that possession was a condition not material to the 
RDA. Even though possession did not take place, such non-
occurrence of possession should not relieve the RDA of its duty to 
pay interest in full as required under the terms of the 
stipulation, less the cost of what was not performed, which in this 
case, would be an offset for the benefit to the plaintiff of the 
net rent the RDA should have received had possession been given. 
(6 Corbin on Contract Section 1370 (1962)). 
The RDA has agreed to pay this difference as set forth on page 
10 of its Brief stating: "The RDA is willing either to have the 
order nun pro tunc effective and pay the interest agreed to, but 
with the attendant right to receive possession of and income from 
the property." This would alleviate any injustice to the owners, 
who were led to believe that interest continued to accrue to their 
benefit without the need to give up possession of the property, and 
who were prevented from withdrawing the funds as hereafter 
discussed. 
The owners were unable to transfer possession by the 
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withdrawal of funds. On page 12 of the Court's Opinion, it notes 
that the "owners during the approximately 85 days the funds 
deposited with the Court remained unfrozen, never withdrew any of 
the funds." It should be remembered that the owners were not able 
to withdraw those funds because within one week of the entry of 
the stipulation, the tenants filed their Answer and Objection to 
the stipulation claiming the right to the whole thereof. Tenants' 
Objection to Order filed on August 23, 1985, asserted a right under 
the lease agreement to share in the proceeds to be awarded. 
Although the actual "freeze" was not ordered until November 1, 
1985, it would not have been appropriate for the owners to withdraw 
those funds on deposit, given the tenants' claim thereto. 
3. The agreement satisfies the requirements of an option. 
On page 12 of the Court's Opinion, it defines an option contract 
as a "promise which meets the requirements for the formation of a 
contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer." It 
is not clear whether the Opinion misapprehends whether the 
stipulation does not comply with the requirements of an option. 
Certainly it is not mutually exclusive to have a stipulation that 
can also incorporate option terms. There is no question but what 
we have a stipulation that complies with the requirements for the 
formation of a contract. There is also no question that the 
stipulation by its terms limits the power of the owners to revoke 
or back out of their promise to grant possession and give up any 
and all defenses against the RDA's right to condemn if Lincoln and 
RDA enter into their ADL. In entering into the stipulation, the 
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owners gave the RDA an exclusive right to acquire the property 
which the owners could not thereafter revoke. The requirements of 
an option are complied with. 
If the Court is stating its opinion that the agreement does 
not meet the definition of an option, this should be clarified. 
In conclusion, rehearing should be granted to allow this Court 
to give full consideration to the contract provisions which show 
that no relationship exists between the payment of interest and the 
awarding of actual possession, but if this Court concludes 
otherwise, it should determine that actual possession was not a 
material condition and that interest should be awarded after 
allowing an offset for rents received, which amount should be 
determined by the trial court upon remand. 
POINT II 
IN DETERMINING WHAT COSTS MAY BE AWARDED, THE 
COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE MEANING OF THE ACTUAL 
WORDING OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 11-19-
23.9 (1986). 
In the Court's discussion of issue III, beginning on page 16 
of the Opinion, it concludes that since Section 11-19-23.9 does not 
expressly provide for compensation for expert witnesses, "costs" 
should be defined as meaning taxable court costs as provided by 
Rule 54(d)(1). The Court overlooks the fact that such 
interpretation would be (1) inconsistent with the meaning of 
"costs" as used elsewhere in the same Section, (2) not give meaning 
to the word "including" as provided in the Section, (3) not be 
consistent with the fact that under this section the award of costs 
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is discretionary with the court. 
1. The Court has failed to address the fact that the word 
"costs" is used twice in Section 11-19-23.9. The statute also 
authorizes an award for "costs and expenses, if any, of relocating 
the owner." Unless the legislature intended two separate 
definitions of the same word used in the same act, the legislature 
did not intend that "costs," be limited to the narrow definition 
of taxable court costs. The term should be given a consistent 
interpretation unless the legislature indicates otherwise. To give 
harmony to the meaning of "costs" as used in both sentences in the 
section, it should appear that the legislature intended "costs" in 
the sense of reimbursement to the owner for expenses necessarily 
incurred. It is not enough to say that just because the 
legislature did not define costs, it must have meant "taxable court 
costs." "Costs" should be interpreted so as to harmonize with the 
use of the term throughout the statute. 
2. The Opinion fails to attach any meaning to use of the 
work "included." On page 20 of its Opinion, the Court states that 
"Section 11-19-23.9 authorizes compensation for costs and attorneys 
fees. . . ." (Emphasis added.) This is a very critical 
misstatement of what is authorized by that Section. The Court has 
in fact interpreted that Section as though it did authorize costs 
"and" attorneys fees, but in fact, the Section authorizes "costs, 
including a reasonable attorneys fee." (Emphasis added.) The use 
of the word "including" is not synonymous with "and." The Court 
fails to address that distinction, but simply interprets the 
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provision as though "including" were nowhere to be found in the 
statute, nor does the Court give any reason as to why it feels that 
"including" should have the same meaning as the word "and." 
"Including" denotes that attorneys fees are a part of the 
meaning of the term "costs," hence extending the definition and the 
meaning of costs beyond the narrow definition of taxable court 
costs. 
3. The legislature would not have made the statute 
permissive if it intended that "costs" meant taxable court costs. 
The Court correctly points out on page 19 of the Opinion that 
Section 11-19-23.9 is permissive and discretionary with the Court, 
i.e., the Court "may" award costs. This is further indication that 
the legislature did not intend the costs to be limited to taxable 
court costs under Rule 54(d)(1), inasmuch as such taxable costs are 
not discretionary with the Court. The legislature must have 
intended that such costs being so authorized were those types of 
costs that were discretionary costs and not the mandatory court 
costs. The Court seems to have overlooked this inconsistent result 
in its Opinion and this should be addressed by the Court to make 
a full and complete determination of the meaning of the statute. 
The Opinion, as presently rendered by the Court, does not 
address either the meaning of "including" as set forth in the 
statute, nor does it attempt to give harmony to the term "costs" 
as used elsewhere in the statute nor does it explain the effect of 
making the awarding of Rule 54(d)(1) costs discretionary. The 
literal meaning of those provisions and terms should be given 
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effect and not overlooked by the Court. The owners are not arguing 
that the constitution so requires, but simply that the legislature 
has so intended. 
I certify that the foregoing petition is in good faith and not 
for delay. 
Dated this 24th day of October, 1989. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
John T. Evans 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
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